This paper assesses UK economic policy towards economic globalisation and its impact on the UK economy. Both the previous new Labour governments and the current coalition have advanced a clear position that global economic trends, particularly integrated capital markets and the emergence of low wage manufacturing exporters, offer large potential gains to the UK economy but could result in serious losses of output and employment if inappropriate policies are pursued. The paper assesses these claims by examining developments since the mid-1990s in the UK's trade and current account position, inward and outward direct investment and the impact of globalisation processes on macroeconomic policy and income distribution. It assesses the role of globalisation processes in promoting imbalances within the economy, and the UK economy's potential to respond to geographical shifts in the global economy. The paper assesses whether contemporary policy approaches to economic globalisation constitute an appropriate response.
Introduction
Globalisation was central to new Labour policy perspectives and there has been considerable policy continuity with the coalition government. Not only traditional areas of macroeconomic and industrial policy, but also other areas such as welfare and education policy have increasingly been framed in terms of the challenges of global integration. Moreover, the UK economy was already highly integrated internationally, with relatively high trade integration and long-standing international financial and trading links as well as multinationals going back to nineteenth century trading companies (e.g. Held et al., 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 2000) . New Labour was criticised academically and politically for acceding to a hyper-globalisation view that exaggerates its impact and understates both the remaining policy space and the possibilities for shaping global integration and institutions open to a leading economy (e.g. Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Watson and Hay, 2003) . Nevertheless, more recently others have suggested that official analysis of globalisation tends to underestimate its effects (e.g. Brown et al., 2011) , whilst the effects of globalisation have been proposed as the core underlying determinants of the current financial crisis (Turner, 2008) . This paper attempts to assess new Labour policy towards globalisation in the context of international economic integration trends of the UK economy over the past decade. Section 2 outlines new Labour's assessment of and policy towards economic globalisation trends. In the light of this, the following three sections analyse recent developments in the UK economy: section 3 examines trends in UK trade volumes and patterns and current account developments; section 4 examines trends in foreign direct investment flows into and out of the UK and the activities of multinational corporations; section 5 examines the overall impact of globalisation on UK macroeconomic policy over the past decade and on income distribution. Section 6 concludes.
Globalisation and UK Economic Policy
The prevailing new Labour policy view was that globalisation had fundamentally altered the parameters of economic policy -both in terms of macroeconomic management and the longer term framework of economic policy.
1 Broadly similar views have been advanced by the coalition government, asserting that rhetoric aside in practice the new Labour administrations pursued policies that were not based on growth driven through gains from globalisation and, indeed, actively undermined the UK economy's ability to realise potential gains from globalisation and left it less well equipped to do so than its major competitors (HM Treasury, 2011; cf. Redwood and Wolfson, 2007; BIS, 2011) .
Global integration of product and capital markets and the growth of multinational production have led to a major shift in global patterns of production with the continuing rise of China, India and other leading developing country exporters. These countries' exports are rapidly rising up the quality ladder by acquiring technology through inward investment, developing their own innovation capacity and investing heavily in human capital development. The result is increased competitive pressure on developed economies like the UK, leading to greater specialisation in production but also stronger rewards (or, at least, potential rewards) for higher end production and greater returns to innovation and to highly skilled labour. Whereas in the post-war period multinational production has been concentrated amongst developed economies, there is now increased competition for FDI inflows from emerging market economies and a growing spread of multinational production. Once non-tradable services are increasingly subject to international competition through trade and/or international production as new communications technologies make them more tradable. 2 These trends are largely explicable in terms of standard trade theory, although relative advantage can also reflect clustering effects. Either way, unambiguous policy conclusions are drawn from this. The standard gains from trade specialisation still apply, reinforced by dynamic gains from trade through pro-competitive effects of exporting and import competition. The appropriate policy response is not intervention, but to promote deregulation and flexible labour, product and capital markets (cf. esp. HM Treasury, 2005A; 2011; HM Treasury and DTI, 2004) . The key prerequisite to realising gains and limiting costs from adjustment is market flexibility to transfer resources from declining to expanding firms and industries; indeed, one official study estimated that in the 1990s almost all of TFP growth in UK manufacturing was accounted for by entry and exit of firms (DTI, 2006: 18n36) , arguably undermining the official emphasis on other pro-competitive effects of trade.
On this analysis, the UK economy is well placed to benefit from these trends provided that appropriate policies are pursued. The UK has a long-standing comparative advantage in several high-tech and/or skilled labour-intensive manufactures as well as in services exports. The benefits from inward FDI in terms of boosting the capital stock and transferring technology are widely claimed; outward FDI benefits the UK economy not simply in terms of receipts but also through strengthening company performance domestically; thus, outward investment may boost output and employment in the UK rather than leading to a net transfer of activity overseas. Similarly, out-sourcing of parts of the value chain to independent overseas producers may also boost core business in the UK. This account acknowledges historic problems with physical and human capital accumulation in the UK economy; with the former, policies to create a stable macroeconomic environment should boost investment whilst this analysis sees the UK as increasingly part of an integrated global capital market with a policy regime likely to attract inward investment. Human capital formation, particularly for the least skilled, is highlighted as a key area for government intervention and there is some recognition of the low skill equilibrium trap problems of the UK economy (HM Treasury, 2004C) . The emphasis here is on the development of generic skills in the light of the emphasis on structural change. Some qualifications to this analysis are offered. DTI (2004A) acknowledges that there are limits to these globalisation processes in practice. Patterns of international economic activity fall short of fully integrated global markets with activity in many sectors still largely determined by domestic factors; even amongst manufacturing industries there is little relationship between performance and overseas sales but a strong relationship with domestic sales (ref?). Although much is made of the increased tradability of services, DTI (2004A: 52) cites estimates that only around 12-16 per cent of service sector jobs could be potentially outsourced overseas and only around 5 per cent are contestable by low wage economies. Overall the UK economy is predicted to continue to be a net gainer from services trade liberalisation, in particular if a major General Agreement on Trade in Services can be negotiated through the WTO (HM Treasury, 2005D). The potential gains from services liberalisation at both the EU and global level have been repeatedly emphasised by both the coalition government and its new Labour predecessors.
There are two notable features of this assessment. First, the conception of globalisation as both an opportunity and a challenge comes close to a knifeedge assessment: pursue inappropriate policies and the UK economy faces the prospect of major welfare losses and unemployment, but the UK is also wellplaced to gain significantly from these trends if the right policies are pursued. The global economy may be reaching a 'tipping point' for services trade and outsourcing (HM Treasury, 2004B: 29) , although elsewhere, as noted above, studies indicate the potential tradability of many services remains limited. This is related to the second point: although the gains are largely presumed to be very widespread, there is minimal discussion of the possibility of significant groups of losers within Britain in the context of overall welfare improvements. Although there is a strong emphasis on structural adjustment induced by foreign competition as a source of productivity growth and gains from trade (e.g. DTI, 2004A; HM Treasury and DTI, 2004) , provided markets are sufficiently flexible displaced factors of production can move quickly and easily from declining to expanding firms and sectors whilst cheaper products provide a key source of general gains. The analysis claims both that structural adjustment is a major potential source of gains from trade, but also that displacement costs and unemployment problems are likely to be low and short-term in nature relative to these gains (e.g. BIS, 2011). Whereas standard trade analysis indicates that a corollary of significant gains from trade is that they would also be expected to give rise to significant income distribution effects for plausible elasticity values (e.g. Wood, 1994; Rodrik, 1997) , this is largely not considered here. Recent trends are likely to accentuate this: the integration of China not only substantially increases trade with developing countries, and thus its income distribution effects, but also shifts this trade towards low income countries with much greater wage differentials than the middle income countries that dominated North-South manufactures trade in previous decades. There is some suggestion that with firms of heterogeneous productivity levels the process of creative destruction following trade liberalisation leads to price falls that can significantly mitigate or even reverse the income losses of scarce factors after liberalisation (DTI, 2006) . The potential for successful policy activism is largely dismissed here, on the basis of standard arguments that market failures are best addressed at source, as well as international and regional agreements that restrict the potential for industrial policy. Apart from education and training, the key exceptions here to the general conclusions against intervention are measures to support exporters and to attract inward investment (DTI, 2006; BIS, 2011) . Arguments for industrial policy and measures to promote industrial clusters are explicitly rejected on the grounds that governments cannot pick winners. Even with human capital formation, the emphasis here is less on systemic private under-provision but instead on information problems that may limit provision: 'for instance there may be information asymmetries, whereby firms are unaware of how useful training is likely to be for their staff or how to obtain it' (DTI, 2004A: 45) . In the context of a general emphasis that the simple existence of market failures does not necessarily justify intervention, this is an odd collection of other interventions; although there is some attempt to justify them individually in terms of evidence of market failure (DTI, 2006) , there is no wider justification of why these particular interventions rather than others are chosen as exceptions to the general non-interventionist rule.
Thus the official view of both the current and previous UK is that Britain's is well-placed to reap the benefits from globalisation trends, both in terms of its patterns of comparative advantage and its flexibility in responding to structual change. More recent government assessments have argued the need for further reform to strengthen the flexibility of the UK economy. In the more optimistic versions of this assessment the UK's relative advantage lies in products and services that will allows out to reap the gains from increased trade with emerging market economies without a major negative impact on particular groups or significant adjustment costs. OECD analysis provides some support for the notion that the UK is relatively well placed to benefit from globalisation given that its patterns of specialisation differ significantly from the major emerging market economies and its flexibility, although they also identify problems in UK skills levels, productivity gaps and infrastructure provision (OECD, 2007, ch. 1; Rae and Sollie, 2007) .
There are several possible difficulties with this largely sanguine view, both in general and specifically in relation to the UK economy. The assumption that trade with developing countries has had a limited, and largely beneficial, impact on British labour markets is based upon dated estimates when trade with developing countries was relatively small. As Krugman (2008) notes for the US case, not only have manufacturing (and services) imports from developing countries increased substantially since initial estimates indicated that their impact was limited, this trade is increasingly with countries with much greater wage differentials. Further, as these economies move into increasingly sophisticated product ranges this implies labour market effects that go beyond simply specialisation adversely affecting the least skilled British workers and towards increasingly global labour markets for a much greater proportion of the workforce (e.g. Brown et al., 2011) including the possibility in theory at least of net income losses for economies like the UK (cf. Gomory and Baumol, 2000; Samuelson, 2004) .
Trade and Current Account Developments
The UK economy has relatively high trade shares that grew throughout the post-war period. Measured as trade flows relative to GDP this ratio has continued to grow, although this is somewhat misleading in comparing gross trade statistics to value added. Overall, the proportion of output exported and import penetration relative to total domestic demand changed little over the decade since 1997 (Mahajan, 2006A; 2006B) ; this holds when disaggregated by manufacturing or services. The UK current account was close to balance in 1997 for the first time since the early 1980s, but has been in continuous deficit since. This should be set in context of the real appreciation of sterling, in large measure from capital account developments discussed below. As noted above, the official view is a sanguine one that disturbances to the exchange rate from its equilibrium level are largely self-correcting and that the process of adjustment to restore external balance is unlikely to pose serious problems for the maintenance of internal balance. Before the new Labour government there had been extensive debate as to whether there had been a trend improvement in UK manufacturing export performance from the 1980s and/or whether external balance constraints would become binding in the absence of either an unprecedented improvement in manufacturing or an implausible growth in services exports (e.g. Cosh et al., 1993) . In practice neither happened: as Coutts et al. (2007) discuss, the manufacturing balance continued to deteriorate over this period; domestic manufacturing output stagnated so that with rising productivity manufacturing employment continued to fall. The current account position was partially cushioned by favourable terms of trade developments, returns on UK overseas investments and improvements on the balance of financial and business services; the balance on more traditional services, notably tourism, deteriorated. The UK continued to lose market share in manufacturing industries trade over this period (Buisan et al., 2006) , although the key exceptions were pharmaceuticals, computers and communication equipment -all high technology sectors. The evidence here points to UK exporters as price-takers in global markets and that the evolution of market shares largely reflects exchange rate movements, although there is also evidence of relatively low income elasticities of demand for UK exports. Other evidence also point to recent developments in global trade having a negative impact on UK trade shares; Barrell et al. (2006) found that China's entry into global markets were associated with lower UK export shares whilst the relative technology intensity of exports are significantly associated with changes in export share and that Britain's falling relative technology intensity since the mid-1990s partly explains the decline in Britain's export share over this period; further, although completion of the Single European Market programme acted to raise trade levels within Europe as British exports rose less rapidly than its major competitors so that it was associated with a falling British export share.
Thus, although much of the UK export performance over this period can be explained by exchange rate movements, the high technology composition of exports appears to have a longer term impact on trading performance. Examining trends in trade of high technology products depends on the criteria used and the degree of data disaggregation; at relatively high levels of aggregation these can effectively be defined in terms of indicators of sectoral R&D expenditure and other high technology inputs, but such measures may be too broad; finer classifications combine these indicators with more subjective assessments (Guerrieri and Milana, 1995; Guerrieri, 1999) . Over the 1970-95 period the UK saw the largest falls in indicators of relative advantage in technologically specialised products amongst major developed economies, although it retained a relative advantage in science-based industries particularly reflecting its advantage in pharmaceutical products. Guerrieri (1999) estimated a contribution to trade balance (CTB) indicator of the form:
for industry j in country i, where a contribution above/below zero indicates the contribution to trade balance is greater/less than their percentage share in the countries' total trade and thus reveals patterns of specialisation. Table 1 indicates values and changes in these for industries classified by type. 3 Thus, whereas Guerrieri (1999) found a worsening of the UK's trading position across manufacturing industries recent trends to point to clear maintenance of a relative advantage in the technologically specialised industries. The UK's performance in high technology products… Current account deficits have been associated with deterioration in durables and capital goods balances (e.g. Burda and Gerlach, 1992) -more sanguine
Another measure of international technological performance is the technology balance of payments accounts; although relatively trivial in terms of the overall current account position, this balance provides a useful indicator of the relative technological position of the country in terms of receipts from technological licensing etc relative to international payments for such services. 4 Figure 1 shows that having been in approximate balance since the early 1980s, the UK has shown a clear surplus on these payments since the mid-1990s. 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 Year
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This raises key issues around the direction of trade, and particularly manufacturing trade with industrialising developing and transition economies, and the role of services trade. Whilst there is some evidence of improvements in manufacturing export competitiveness over the 1980s, overall the deterioration of the manufactures balance in the 1970s continued over the 1980s (e.g. Coutts and Godley, 1992) .
The new Labour analysis of the effects of increased trade with developing countries can be rationalised along the following lines. Official studies cite earlier estimates that indicate a limited impact of trade on wage inequality in the UK in line with much -but by no means all (cf. Wood, 1994 ) -of earlier work on initial expansion of manufactures trade with developing countries; the corollary, though, is that the gains from this would be relatively small. The expansion of manufactures trade with developing countries and its extension to economies with significantly lower wag countries might be expected to magnify income distribution effects (Krugman, 2008) . Large (potential) gains without significant income distribution effects if trade between the UK and these countries has effectively reached complete specialisation and consists of the exchange of dissimilar products with global specialisation increasing demand for goods in which an economy like the UK would be expected to have a comparative advantage. In practice, this may not be straight-forward: first, exports from China in particular have, as the UK government acknowledges, have up-graded from basic low skill manufactures; second, beyond very simple models it is not clear-cut that increased specialisation will lead to rising demand for those products. UK has a significant negative association between its revealed comparative advantage and that of the dynamic Asian economies (OECD, 2007: 35) . Singh (1989) provides a nuanced picture for the impact of increased manufactured exports from industrialising economies: whilst the UK consistently had a positive balance of manufactured trade with these countries over the 1970s and 1980s this diminished over the period. A positive balance itself, moreover, would not preclude significant income distribution effects (see below).
The trends Singh identified have continued. Figures for trade with newly industrialising economies (NIEs) in the late 1990s are likely to have been affected by the East Asian currency 1997 crisis. The UK has been in deficit in trade in goods with the Asian NIEs throughout this period. As table 2 shows this deficit on goods has grown in absolute terms. To raise a point considered more generally below, although the UK has consistently run a surplus on services trade with these economies, as table 3 shows this has fallen some way short of offsetting the deficits in goods trade. The position of Chinaincluding, from 1997, Hong Kong SR -is particularly noteworthy here. China accounts for the majority of the deficit of the goods trade deficit with these countries as its goods imports have grown (in nominal terms) at 21.5 per cent annually over the past decade whilst goods exports to China have only grown at 13 per cent annually over the same period. Indeed, by 2005 China accounted for around a fifth of the UK's deficit in goods trade and whereas the deficit in goods trade with China was less than half that with Japan a decade ago now it is over double the deficit with Japan. The product composition of this trade has become more sophisticated shifting away from SITC 6 manufactures in which these countries might be expected to have a comparative advantage and towards SITC 7-8 categories of finished manufactures which overlap more closely with production in the UK. Income distribution effects are expected to impact where there is incomplete specialisation; if imports from NIEs were largely confined to non-competing manufactures any impact on wages would be small (e.g. Wood, 1994) . It was these countries that dominated the UK's trade with NIEs -elsewhere its goods trade with India is roughly in balance (although a small deficit in services trade has opened up) and trade with industrialising economies in Latin America and with the CEE transition economies remains small. The longstanding problems of UK manufactured export performance was before largely due to deficits with countries at similar levels of development where intra-industry trade predominated. Manufactures trade with NIEs, as more clearly inter-industry trade, might be expected to be more clearly based on specialisation based upon differences in relatively factor supplies (particularly of labour of different skill levels -cf. Wood, 1994) . Moreover, NIEs might be expected to run current account deficits during rapid growth, although China and Taiwan have not done so and the crisis-hit East Asian countries faced sharp pressures for current account adjustment in the late 1990s. Overall, the worsening goods trade position with NIEs since the mid-1990s suggests that the problems with UK manufacturing external performance are now affecting its competitive position relative to emerging manufactures exporters too.
China comparative advantage increasingly reflects its integration with international production networks and specialisation in stages of production process; nevertheless trade with Europe is more clearly characterised by the exchange of dissimilar final products with much more limited trade in components and semi-finished goods compared to China's trade with North America or Asia (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2002) . Instead whereas Europe has a predictable deficit in trade of final consumption goods it has a larger surplus with China on capital goods trade than other trading blocs. This is a sector in which the UK does not enjoy a clear comparative advantage. Wells (1989) pointed out that earlier claims that the UK's deficit on goods trade was unimportant insofar as it reflects increased specialisation in services were not supported by the data during the Thatcher era. The position on net services trade has improved since the mid-1990s, although this is not out of line with the picture in the previous two decades; as figure 2 shows the large shift over the latter period of new Labour government has been the rising contribution of net income receipts. Since labour income flows are in approximate balance, this is overwhelmingly due to the investment account. More specifically, the post-war period has tended to see net surpluses on the direct investment income account partially offset by other flows, particularly net income payments by banks. The first half of the current decade has seen an improvement in income from direct investment, much of this accounted for by income accruing to firms in the financial sector. This appears to reflect not just changes in the net overseas asset position, but also improvements in the rates of return on outward FDI that had declined over the latter half of the 1990s. 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
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Thus, overall, the services trade picture has changed relatively little from the earlier period Wells (1989) analysed. The UK has a clear relative advantage in some services, particularly financial and businesses services, but this has been partially offset by growth of services imports (particularly in tourism). Whilst at the start of the new Labour administration surpluses on services trade and incomes approximately offset the trade deficit thereafter the current account deficit has worsened despite improvements on the 'invisibles' account.
The official view is that the UK can be expected to gain significantly from increased services trade with high income elasticity of demand for commercial (business and financial) services and on-going negotiations to reduce barriers to services trade both regionally and globally (HM Treasury, 2005D, esp. ch. 3); trade restrictions are held to lead to services trade being significantly below potential levels and with faster than 'average productivity growth in the UK amongst these services the UK could experience significant growth in this trade. Nevertheless, since 1990 'other commercial services trade' -including business and financial services, but excluding the traditional trades service of transport and tourism -has only grown globally at or slightly above the growth of world merchandise trade; moreover, the UK's share of this trade has only risen slightly over 1990-2005 from 8.2 to 10.9 per cent. 5 The future may see the sort of boom in commercial services trade that could compensate for a deteriorating balance elsewhere but thus far there is limited evidence for this.
Whereas past Labour administrations regarded current account deficits as a problem to be targeted -epitomised by the 1976 IMF loan -and the previous Conservative administration explicitly saw them as a non-problem to the extent that the reflected imbalances between private investment and savings (as the result of inter-temporal choices by UK residents and/or reflecting confidence in the performance prospects of the UK economy by overseas investors -for a critical analysis see Cripps and Godley, 1992) . For all the emphasis on competitiveness in general there has been little direct reference to the net external position or policies to ensure trend improvement. The emphasis on attracting inward FDI could be construed as implying that a deficit is seen largely as the counterpart to capital account movements which themselves reflect the long-term attractiveness of the UK economy as a production base.
By definition the current account deficit must have its counterpart in a capital account surplus. This, however, is not the counterpart to the position on FDI; FDI -inward and outward -boomed at the end of the 1990s in the context of a global M&A boom. However, outward FDI consistently exceeded inward FDI, although this was only marked during the late 1990s boom. Portfolio investment has fluctuated over the period, but has tended to show a net inflow over this period, initially reflecting demand for UK equities in the late 1990s but in the current decade has shifted towards demand for bonds reflecting relatively high UK rates of return. Over this decade there has been a sharp rise in gross other financial flows -chiefly international deposits and loans by UK banks -but in net terms this only shows a small surplus.
A noteworthy feature here is that the UK economy, like the US, appears to be able to earn net investment income despite its net foreign liabilities exceeding its foreign assets, with a net foreign liability position of around 14 per cent of GDP in 2005 (Whitaker, 2006) . This may be a statistical artefact -there are global discrepancies between recorded foreign assets and liabilities and there are problems with the valuation of outward FDI stocks in particular. Nevertheless, there is prima facie evidence that the UK economy is able to earn net investment income as a net investor from higher relative rates. This yield differential emerged in the mid-1980s but has largely persisted since. In part this reflects the clear trend of the UK economy towards a net asset position in FDI, which would be expected to have relatively high returns, but it also reflects differences in the nature of the banking system's foreign asset and liability profile.
As Chris Dillow, amongst others have noted, a key feature of the downturn with the current financial crisis is that the UK current account position has remained weak. Although a recession would normally be expected to improve the current account, this could be attributed to downturns in major export markets. Nevertheless the evidence here points to a longer term weakening that predates the 2008-crisis in terms of a worsening of any trade-off between unemployment and the current account -the 'balance of payment Phillips curve':
Overall, patterns of UK trade specialisation have been far from static, but there remains a persistent trade deficit with emerging deficits with NIEs. This is partially offset by services trade and investment income. Whilst this has been a capital account inflow, this does not reflect net long term inward investment but shorter-term flows.
Foreign Direct Investment Multinational Operations
Over the past decade the UK has maintained its position as both one of the world's leading holders of FDI and one of the leading host nations; its share of world outward FDI stocks rose from 10.6 per cent in 1995 to 11.6 per cent a decade later and its share of global inward FDI stocks rose from 6.8 to 8.1 per cent over the same period. In the context of a persistent current account deficit UK outward net flows consistently exceeded inward net FDI flows over this period. Table 6 shows that the UK has particularly high stocks of both inward and outward FDI, but the net asset position of the UK is also demonstrated. Nevertheless, this masks the role of inward FDI in UK industry. Since coming to power overseas share of manufacturing output has risen from around a quarter to a third and around a fifth of total business activity. Foreign MNCs are now undertaking a significant minority of private R&D activity in the manufacturing and services sectors, with foreign MNCs share of R&D having risen from 30.8 to 39.4 per cent since 1995 and their share of total business R&D having risen from 32.8-38.6 per cent over the same period. 6 Foreign affiliates in manufacturing have a relative high export propensity and contribute disproportionately to UK manufacturing exports (Kneller and Pisu, 2004) . Although comparable figures are not available for the service sector it is widely reported that there is majority foreign ownership of firms in the Square Mile. More generally table 7 points to the growing importance of the tertiary sector in both inward and outward FDI for the UK.
Policy towards FDI under new Labour has largely followed that which had emerged under the previous Conservative administrations (Hood and Young, 1997) . Eschewing any sector-specific policy -although there was a regional policy dimension in attempting to attract inward FDI to areas of low employment -the policy objective was to establish a tax, regulatory and industrial relations system that would attract inward investment for its presumed benefits in terms of employment and technology spillovers. There is evidence that investment in the UK is sensitive to relative factor prices and taxation policy (Young, 1999) , which would provide some rationale for the new Labour policy of cutting corporation tax rates in part to attract inward investment. The new Labour policy to FDI is not without its problems. Much of the inward investment, particularly in the late 1990s, was in the form of M&A with research indicating that the positive impact of such acquisitions on performance is questionable. Strategic asset-seeking investment has been significant and the long-term welfare implications for the UK of this are unclear as MNCs tap into existing clusters of relative technological advantage. Although there is evidence of technology spillovers from inward investment in manufacturing, the gains from this do not appear to be sufficiently large to justify the inducements offered (cf. Haskell et al., 2007) . In the services sector the productivity differentials between foreign affiliates and domestic MNCs appear to be less pronounced (Griffith et al., 2004) .
Over this period 80+ per cent of UK outward investment FDI stocks are in other developed countries. 7 There has been a long-standing predominance of intra-industry FDI in the UK's position (Driffield and Love, 2005) , which tends to be associated with FDI in other developed economies. There has been little shift of UK MNCs investing in China or other emerging low wage manufactures producers. The impact on domestic capital accumulation and wages thus largely depends upon conditions in the UK relative to other developed countries. Although Feldstein (1995) found that for developed countries outward FDI appeared to lead to one-for-one decline in domestic investment (with inward FDI raising the domestic capital stock with no crowding out effect), these estimates may be subject to omitted variable bias and may not be robust. Estimating at the level of industries following… There is some evidence of increased sensitivity to labour costs, particularly in FDI intensive industries leading to significant effects on wages and capital formation (Hatzius, 2000) . Evidence on outsourcing does appear to support expectations that it tends to raise domestic economic activity by improving the competitiveness of UK companies (Amiti and Wei, 2005) . Overall though labour costs appear to affect investment more through their effects on UK competitiveness than through inducing locational effects (Young, 1999) . There is some evidence that relative tax rates do affect investment in the UK (Young, 1999) , but overall amongst OECD countries there is no clear evidence that lower tax rates have a significant effect on FDI flows (Gorg et al., 2007) .
Policy Impact
As noted in section 2, although the changes to the framework for monetary policy were undertaken in the context of reassuring global financial markets, the degree of openness is secondary to justifying this framework. In standard Barro-Gordon analysis openness is expected to steepen the Phillips curve reducing the gains from inflation and thereby shifting the incentives for monetary authorities to target low inflation, but the theoretical and empirical foundations of this hypothesis are weak (Temple, 2002) . Nevertheless, the period of Non-Inflationary Continuous Expansion is widely attributed in part to globalisation, a claim supported by Bank of England officials (Bean, 2006) . On one level falling prices of imports from developing economies represents a relative price shift rather than a change in the price level; whilst good prices deflation has been more pronounced in the UK than in the US or the eurozone (reflecting its higher trade shares with low wage producers and real exchange rate appreciation), but services price inflation has been higher in the UK leading to a roughly similar inflation performance overall. Nevertheless, the positive terms of trade effect would be expected to ease the achievement of low inflation; although developing country industrialisation may indirectly offset this positive terms of trade effect through the impact on commodity prices overall the net effect appears to be positive (Pain et al., 2006) . Globalisation is also held to have affected inflation dynamics leading to a pronounced flattening of the Phillips curve over this period. The reverse implication to earlier is predicted upon the basis of globalisation reducing mark-up power and wage pressures together with a reduced responsiveness of output gap to domestic conditions and increased responsiveness to overseas ones. Disentangling the effects of globalisation relative to increased effectiveness of monetary policy, anchoring of inflationary expectations or simply luck in terms of the absence of adverse shocks (cf. Benati, 2007 ) is problematic. Whereas Borio and Filardo (2007) find evidence of increased sensitivity of developed countries' inflationary processes to global capacity conditions and decreased sensitivity to domestic conditions, Ihrig et al. (2007) rework this and find their results highly sensitive to the measures of foreign capacity used with no trend decline in the responsiveness of inflation to the domestic output gap. Direct Bank of England modelling of UK inflationary processes is consistent with claims of changes in the mark-up processes and increased impact of import prices so that even in phases where the labour share rose the inflationary impact was counteracted by import price effects. (Batini et al., 2005) . IMF estimates indicate that globalisation processes account for somewhere between a quarter and a half of the flattening of the UK Phillips curve from the 1990s (Iakova, 2007) .
The implications of globalisation for macroeconomic policy are largely seen to follow from this analysis. The granting of operational independence over monetary policy to the Bank of England was part of a wider reform of the framework for macroeconomic policy (Balls, 1998; Balls and O'Donnell, 2002) . The emphasis here is on credibly signalling to financial markets a commitment to stability in macroeconomic policy by also providing a framework for a fiscal policy of a stable target for the debt-GDP ratio, thereby signalling that budget balance will be achieved over the business cycle with no borrowing for current expenditure. Productivity growth rates and labour force participation are to be boosted through supply-side deregulation, although reinforced by active labour market policies to raise participation amongst vulnerable groups. Thus, as Arestis and Sawyer argue, new Labour have accepted the 'new consensus macroeconomics' view of an essentially stable economy with output and employment fluctuating around natural rates determined by supply side factors and where monetary policy, credibly operated by an independent central bank, should thus be directed at controlling inflation and fiscal policy should operate almost exclusively through automatic stabilisers (cf. Angeriz and Arestis, 2007; Sawyer, 2007) .
Strictly speaking the degree of openness of an economy is secondary to the validity or otherwise of much of this policy view: the macroeconomic policy framework is based upon standard time inconsistency analysis and the microeconomic approach is based upon standard arguments for market flexibility combined with a new growth theory emphasis on human capital formation. Nevertheless, globalisation is perceived to have altered the costs of different policy packages. For macroeconomic policy the claim here is that international markets punish policy mistakes more sharply than in the past so that unwise policy packages have become more costly (Balls, 1998; cf. Balls and O'Donnell, 2002; HM Treasury, 2002) . This is not to make economic policy simply subordinate to the judgement of the financial markets, as arguably the previous administration had done ; Balls (1998: 121) in particular argues that international financial markets 'can sometimes be misinformed, short-termist, irrational, speculative and herd-like' so that they are capable of supporting unsustainable policies for a period before turning rapidly and sharply against them, citing Britain's ERM experience as an example of this. 8 Moreover, drawing on an early version of Mosley (2003) , he argued that financial markets' country assessments draw on a narrow range of indicators that effectively permits governments the freedom to pursue a variety of policies without provoking an adverse reaction; in particular, financial markets do not appear to place much weight on the levels and patterns of government expenditure (provided it is not deficit-financed). Credible policies are capable of generating a virtuous circle effect of lowering long run interest rates but also attracting significant capital inflows. The policy framework is characterised as 'constrained discretion', and in principle provides some room for active fiscal policy beyond automatic stabilisers. Although this is proposed in the context of need to retain some policy autonomy rather than simply subordinate macroeconomic policy to the financial markets, this term is largely to distinguish the policy framework from explicit monetary targeting. Further, destabilising movements in exchange rates are very much seen as the exception. Whilst acknowledging that some academic opinion viewed the appreciation of sterling from 1996 as exceeding levels that could be justified by developments in the real economy, Treasury analysts concluded:
Empirical evidence suggests that exchange rate movements have not been a significant source of shocks to the UK economy as a whole. Instead, exchange rate changes appear to have absorbed shocks that might otherwise have had a greater impact on UK output and prices. A striking example of this is sterling's strong appreciation after 1996, which did not result in higher unemployment or a collapse in inflation, but nonetheless restrained the net export contribution to demand and probably alleviated some of the inflationary pressure that might otherwise have occurred. (HM Treasury, 2003: 61) .
In keeping with the overall framework, although trade and FDI may have significant effects on employment patterns they should not in this analysis affect employment levels; beyond frictional unemployment, continued integration would only raise unemployment if market restrictions inhibited the transfer of labour from declining to expanding sectors.
Global financial flows nevertheless posed problems for monetary policy through their effects on the exchange rate. The appreciation of sterling relative to the mark in the latter half of the 1990s was all the more puzzling since for much of the period it went contrary to interest rate differentials. Subsequently sterling appreciated against the euro in the first years of the latter's existence and also saw a phase over 2001-04 of change against the dollar that largely went in the opposite direction from interest rate differentials (see figure 4) . Although the failure of UIP in testing is well known, monetary policy makers appear to regard violations of UIP as being typically unimportant for policy purposes. Of course ex post it is always possible to rationalise these movements in terms of wider variables (Wadhwani, 1999) , but it is not clear if such relations are maintained over time, are exploitable by policy makers and whether or not they compromise the assumed automatic adjustment of the exchange rate. Although such exchange rate moves are cases where foreign exchange market intervention is most likely to be successful, intervention was discussed within the Bank of England but ultimately dismissed as likely to be ineffective (Keegan, 2003) .
The impact of trade and FDI on wage inequality within the UK has been widely debated, but there is evidence that both have a significant impact. Whilst initially it might be thought that such effects from North-South interactions would be limited as effectively complete specialisation set in, as NIEs up-grade their exports this can no longer be presumed. Far less attention though has been paid to the wider point of Rodrik (1997) that trade and FDI in general may be expected to increase the elasticity of demand for labour and thus reduce its power to extract rents. Recent evidence points to the expected increase in the elasticity of demand for labour (OECD, 2007) and a decline in the labour share of national income. Moreover, Guscina (2006) found that shifts in the labour share of national income were significantly and negatively related to openness to trade and FDI flows with the actual evolution of labour's share in the UK closely following the fitted relationship from a regression on these globalisation variables. This moderation of real product wage growth has affected the Phillips curve relations discussed above.
Interpretations of new Labour policy stance here have been subject to some debate. Watson and Hay (2003) directly attribute new Labour's stance to its alleged acceptance of a discredited hyper-globalisation view in terms of the imperatives of competitiveness and the inability of countries to pursue Keynesian policies under high financial integration. Clift and Tomlinson (2007) by contrast reject the view that new Labour have accepted the 'new consensus macroeconomics' and regard them as having initially pursued a range of policies to establish credibility which has subsequently been used to engineer policy space to pursue 'coarse tuning' active Keynesian policies. This line of argument does not appear sustainable either. The claims that new Labour have a more Keynesian view of the economy is derived from a somewhat hair-splitting discussion of pronouncements by Gordon Brown and others relative to a particular interpretation of 'new consensus macroeconomics' doctrine. It is more plausible to see the degree of Keynesianism in the current decade as being a somewhat serendipitous outcome of public policy expenditure stream undertaken for other largely political reasons (e.g. Sawyer, 2007) . 9
Conclusions
New Labour power has presided over continued high and growing levels of integration in trade, finance and multinational production. In these respects policy shows a high degree of continuity, not only with the previous Conservative administration, but also with post-war policies in general. In particular in the financial sphere this reflects long-standing British policy. Macroeconomic policy conditions were noted for relative stability and high employment. The contribution of globalisation to this, though, was unclear. A full balance sheet awaits, but the period has seen continuing trade deficits with the opening up of significant deficits with the NIEs; ambiguous developments in respect of the development of indigenous technological capacity in an economy highly integrated through FDI but -partly through a strengthened net external direct investment position -improvements in overseas investment earnings.
Evidence on specific new Labour claims is mixed. The evidence on automatic adjustment of the exchange rate is questionable and is more consistent over this period with exchange rate movements continuing to be a source of disturbance to the macroeconomy (cf. Cobham, 2002) .
The cases of intervention to support exporting or attract inward FDI are less obvious. Support for exporters, including export credit insurance, is justified in terms of the positive productivity gains from exporting in the context of barriers to trading in the form of non-policy barriers from information failures and network effects and the absence of an effective private insurance market for certain groups of exporters. Even here, though it is noted that the direction of causality between productivity gains and exporting is unclear and there is no systematic cost-benefit analysis of the measures here (DTI, 2004B, ch. 6; . Specifically on export credit guarantees, the government increased funds for the subsidy element of this programme, although an independent report commissioned on this disputed the evidence that market failures justified subsidies (instead of simply public provision of the service on a cost recovery basis) and estimated that phasing out of the subsidy element would have trivial effects on UK export levels. Similarly, although inward FDI may generate positive externalities the evidence that incentives to attract it are cost-effective is ambiguous at best. Human capital and technology policies aside, it is unclear what the rationale for these particular interventions is. 
